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Introduction 
 
This Policy Brief reviews judicial decisions construing state laws that permit 
insurers to include intoxication exclusionary clauses in their insurance policies.  The 
cases and state laws examined in this analysis span health, life, disability, accidental 
death and dismemberment (AD&D), workers compensation, and unemployment 
insurance.  Some variant of the intoxication exclusionary clause appears across all of 
these products, depending on the state.  The widespread nature of such laws has its 
roots in the 1947 Uniform Accident and Sickness Policy Provision Law (UPPL), a model 
statute whose broader public policy purpose was to avoid the use of insurance to 
protect against the risk of unlawful conduct.   
 
As public understanding of alcoholism and addiction as treatable conditions has 
increased, and as the cost of intoxication-related injuries to health care providers and 
society as a whole have become more fully understood, the continued validity of this 
policy argument has collapsed to the point that in 2001, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners repealed the UPPL outright and replaced it with a model 
prohibition against its use by insurers.  But as this Brief discusses at greater length, 
judicial decisions construing the intoxication exclusion frequently find in favor of the 
insurer.  Furthermore, they underscore that affirmatively ending the practice of 
intoxication exclusions requires significantly more than just the repeal of a pre-existing 
statute.  
 
Background 
 
A recent nationwide survey of state insurance laws by Rivara and colleagues1 
reported that 38 states and the District of Columbia2 expressly permitted licensed health 
                                                
a Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor of Health Law and Policy; Director, Center for Health Services Research 
and Policy; Chair, Department of Health Policy, The George Washington University Medical Center,  
School of Public Health and Health Services. 
b J.D. anticipated 2004, The George Washington University School of Law. 
c J.D. and M.P.H. anticipated 2004, The George Washington University School of Law and School of 
Public Health and Health Services. 
d Associate Professor and Vice Chair, Department of Health Policy, The George Washington University 
School of Public Health and Health Services.  The authors would like to acknowledge Dr. Eric Goplerud, 
Director of Ensuring Solutions to Alcohol Problems, The George Washington University School of Public 
Health and Health Services, for his assistance in the preparing this policy brief. 
1 Frederick P. Rivara, et al., “Screening Trauma Patients for Alcohol Problems:  Are Insurance Companies 
Barriers?,” 48 J. Trauma, Injury, Infection and Critical Care 115 (2000). 
1 344 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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insurers to exclude diagnostic and treatment services for conditions related to the use of 
alcohol or drugs, while another 8 state statutes were silent on the subject.3  The study 
also found that the insurance laws in 4 states4 permitted health insurers to exclude 
treatment for injuries incurred as a result of intoxication arising from narcotics, except 
on the advice of a physician, but not alcohol.  
 
Since publication of the Rivara study and the decision by the NAIC to replace the 
older law with an express prohibition of exclusionary clauses, two states5 have enacted 
prohibitions.  However, the legality of such an exclusion where state law is silent was 
illustrated by the 2003 decision in Bishop v. National Health Insurance Co.6 in which the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an intoxication clause in 
an individual health insurance coverage contract purchased in Connecticut, one of the 8 
states in which insurance law is silent.  The hospital emergency bills alone in Bishop 
amounted to more than a quarter million dollars; payment was denied since the victim’s 
intoxicated status had been documented from the time that emergency care began. 
 
As the field of alcohol and drug treatment has evolved in the face of emerging 
evidence regarding the positive effects of brief intervention and initiation of treatment as 
part of emergency care, insurers’ continued use of intoxication treatment has come to 
represent a particularly striking example of the disjunction between evidence-based 
medical care advances and third party payment policies.  Indeed, such exclusions 
actually appear to directly incentivize inappropriate treatment during emergency care, 
thereby widening the gap between evidence-based medicine and actual practice.7  
Health professionals who test for intoxication face the prospect of insurance denials,8 
and the problem may intensify as states increasingly enact laws requiring emergency 
room personnel to develop protocols to screen incoming patients for drug and alcohol 
use.9  A logical response would be to attempt to avoid any health care interventions that 
might reveal intoxication, even where the absence of such interventions undermines the 
standard of care.10   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. 
3 Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Utah, and Wisconsin. 
4 Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. The Rivara study stated that New York has 
adopted a provision that allows for an exclusion only when a beneficiary is injured during the course of 
committing a felony, however, N.Y. Ins. § 3216 (McKinney 2003) contains the general UPPL exclusion for 
drug and alcohol ingestion. 
5 Iowa, Code Ann. § 514A.3(2)(K) (West 2003); and South Dakota., S.D. Codified Laws § 58-17-30.8. 
6 344 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2003). 
7 McGlynn EA. Asch SM. Adams J. Keesey J. Hicks J. DeCristofaro A. Kerr EA. The quality of health care 
delivered to adults in the United States. New England Journal of Medicine. 348(26):2635-45, 2003 Jun 26. 
8 See Rachel Zimmerman, “Why Emergency Rooms Rarely Test Trauma Patients for Alcohol, Drugs,” Wall 
St. J., February 26, 2003. 
9 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19a – 490(h) (West 2003) (requiring hospitals licensed as a short-term 
general hospital, outpatient surgical facility, or outpatient clinic, to include in the record of each trauma 
patient the outcome of screening for alcohol and substance abuse). 
10 Ironically, this strategy of cost avoidance might evaporate were insurers to accompany their coverage 
exclusion with a contractual payment limitation that barred provider payment of treatment for 
emergencies and injuries in the absence of the results from an intoxication screen. 
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The impact of such an exclusion also has the potential to spread to other third 
party payers in the form of bad debt, and to taxpayers as a form of uncompensated 
care whose cost is borne through Medicaid and other uncompensated care financing 
mechanisms.  Put differently, even though the cost of treatment for intoxication-related 
injury and death is enormous -- with much of the cost undoubtedly attributable to 
insured persons -- state legislatures have permitted the insurance industry to avoid 
bearing any burden and have allowed a cost shift onto the general public.  Whatever 
premium savings result from this shifting, undoubtedly pale next to the exposure the 
practice creates for public programs and health care providers.  
 
It certainly may entirely appropriate to treat such costs as a social expenditure, no 
state with the UPPL exclusion in its insurance code appears to have enacted a public 
financing scheme to bear these costs.   
 
Judicial Decisions Construing State Law Versions of the UPPL 
 
 Between 1947 and 2001, the UPPL contained a provision permitting insurers to 
exclude coverage for losses sustained in consequence drug or alcohol influence.  
Specifically, the UPPL provision stated: 
  
The insurer shall not be liable for any loss sustained or contracted in  
 consequence of the insured’s being intoxicated or under the influence 
 of any narcotic unless administered on the advise of a physician.11 
 
No state requires such an exclusion, but in states that have adopted this 
provision, insurance companies are authorized to write contracts that exclude coverage 
for alcohol- or drug-related injuries.  Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia12  
enacted laws that are identical (or nearly so) to the original version of the UPPL.  In 
these states, insurers have express statutory authority to exclude such treatment from 
their contract terms.  When insurance companies do adopt such an exclusion, they are 
generally upheld as valid and not unreasonable.13   
 
a. Degree of causation, burden of proof, and the sufficiency of the evidence  
 
All thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia require insurance companies 
that desire to incorporate an exclusionary clause to adopt the exact language contained 
in the statute, unless “a corresponding provision. . . is not less favorable in any respect 
to the insured or the beneficiary.”14  If an insurance company does not use the exact 
“in consequence” language and offers less favorable terms than that found in the UPPL-
                                                
11 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC Individual Model Laws, Regulations and 
Guidelines, available at http://www.naic.org/insprod/individual_model_laws.htm# (accessed February 
13, 2004). 
12  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
13 43 Am. Jurisprudence 2d, Insurance § 628. 
14 See, e.g., D.C. Code § 31-4712(c)(2) (2003) (formerly D.C. Code § 35-517 (1981)). 
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modeled statute, courts may still require the company to demonstrate that the injury was 
“in consequence,” or causally related to the influence of alcohol.15 
 
Courts vary in the degree of causation they require, but all require insurers to 
demonstrate a connection between intoxication and the injury in order to trigger the 
exclusion.  For example, Florida courts have strictly construed the language in their 
exclusion statute to require insurance companies to demonstrate a high level of 
causation between the insured’s intoxication and the loss in order to successfully deny 
coverage.  In Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. Steck,16 the insured was hit by 
an oncoming vehicle when she attempted to cross a multilane highway while 
intoxicated.  She was taken to the hospital where she lost a leg and incurred over 
$350,000 in medical bills.  Despite these facts, the Steck court held that 
 
[t]wo types of injuries may result from one’s intoxication: direct injury, i.e., 
injury to biological systems of a person, such as acute alcohol poisoning 
or liver damage; and indirect injuries, such as accidental injuries caused 
by the behavior of the person while intoxicated.  Ms. Steck's injuries were 
clearly the latter kind--indirect injuries.  The trial court found, and we 
agree, that the language of Ms. Steck's policy was . . . not specific enough 
to exclude from coverage indirect injuries as well as direct injuries.17 
 
However, some state courts have held that insurance companies need not 
demonstrate a strict causal connection between the intoxication and the loss incurred to 
deny coverage under an old UPPL-type statute.18  In the case of McGarrah by 
McGarrah v. Southwestern Glass Co.,19 the court wrote that “as a general rule if an insurer 
establishes that the intoxication has some causal connection with the death or injury of 
the insured, the insurer may avoid liability” [emphasis added].  In other words, the 
McGarrah court held that intoxication need be only a, not the sole, proximate cause of 
the injury or death in order for the exclusion to trigger. 
 
These cases illustrate the variation in state courts’ approaches to the interpretation 
of the “in consequence of” provision of the UPPL intoxication exclusionary clause.  
This variation in the burden of proof that insurers must meet from state to state 
probably can be explained by variation in judicial approaches to exclusionary clauses 
                                                
15 See Holloway v. J.C. Penney Life Ins.Co., 190 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying Illinois law) (holding 
that the policy’s provision excluding coverage regardless of whether the loss was actually sustained “in 
consequence” of intoxication was less favorable than the language contained in the Illinois statute, and 
that on remand the Illinois statute requiring a causal link between the intoxication and the loss should 
be applied).  See also Olson v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 30 Cal. App. 4th 816, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897 (1st 
Dist. 1994) (same); Rivers v. Conger Life Ins. Co., 229 So. 2d 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist 1969) (same). 
16 778 So.2d 374 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 2001). 
17 Id. at 376. 
18 See, e.g., Bills v. Conseco Ins. Co., 2003 WL 22455399, slip op. at 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
“the [UPPL model] language used in the exclusion clause in the present case is plain, unambiguous, and 
clearly does not require a causal connection between the insured's intoxication and the loss”); Burgess 
v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); Brown v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 861 
S.W.2d 834 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Greene v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (M.D. 
Fla. 1997) (applying Illinois law) (holding that where the insured’s blood alcohol level was 0.10% or 
higher and the insurance company had obtained approval from the Director of the Illinois Department of 
Insurance in advance, the exclusion did not require a causal connection between the intoxication and 
the loss).   
19 41 Ark. App. 215, 852 S.W.2d 328 (1993). 
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in contracts of risk generally.  In some states, courts may by tradition require a high 
level of proof before permitting insurers to avoid liability under duly executed contracts, 
while in other jurisdictions, courts may be willing to tolerate a lesser level of proof.  
These traditions may be shaped by the effects of previous judicial rulings related to the 
construction of insurance contracts (i.e., stare decisis), courts’ awareness of a high 
degree of insurance fraud throughout the state, or other factors.  
 
The level of evidence needed to demonstrate a causal connection between the 
insured’s loss and intoxication or ingestion of drugs will depend on the particular facts 
of the case.  In the absence of any rebuttal evidence, an insurer’s evidence that the 
insured was under the influence of alcohol or drugs while operating a motor vehicle 
may be sufficient to bar recovery after an accident.20  At the same time, courts have 
found for the insured on similar facts.21  A 1994 California decision, Olson v. American 
Bankers Ins. Co.22 provides an example of the lengths to which some courts may be 
willing to go to find for the insured when a policy exclusion is contested.  In Olson, the 
court upheld the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the “in consequence” language 
found in the California statute (identical to that found in the original UPPL) required the 
insurance company to demonstrate that the insured’s intoxication was the proximate 
cause of her death, and not merely a contributing factor.  The court held further that 
while the insured (who had drowned in a hot tub) had a 0.14% blood alcohol level and 
had ingested Valium, there was also a scrape on the insured’s right elbow that could 
have been caused by a fall.  Thus, the court found that the scrape on the insured’s 
elbow could have supported a jury finding that the insured’s death was accidental, and 
that the insured’s intoxication was not the proximate cause of her death. 
 
b. Notice  
 
                                                
20 See Brown v. J.C. Penney, 861 S.W.2d at 834 (holding that a Tennessee criminal statute establishing a 
presumption of intoxication for driving while intoxicated could be used by the life insurance company 
to create a rebuttable presumption that the insured, having died in an automobile accident, was in fact 
intoxicated within the meaning of the policy exclusion).  See also Ober v. CUNA Mut. Soc., 645 So. 2d 
231 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir 1994) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to exclude coverage where blood 
tests from the deceased revealed blood alcohol levels of 0.12%, an expert testified that intoxication made 
the insured forty times more likely to be in a car accident, and the road was straight); Old Equity Life Ins. 
Co. v. Combs, 437 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1969) (holding evidence of insured’s appearing to be drunk, 
staggering, throwing chairs and threatening others sufficient);  Landry v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 23 F. 
Supp. 2d 1351 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (relying on expert testimony on the impact of a 0.25% BAC on a person’s 
driving ability); Giangreco v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 168 F. Supp. 2d 417 (E.D.Pa.) (provision 
excluding coverage where intoxication directly, indirectly, wholly or partly caused the death is 
applicable under Pennsylvania law if the insured’s use of drugs or alcohol played any role therein). 
21 See, e.g., Hastie v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying Florida law) (finding 
error in trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the insurance company despite the fact that the 
insured died in a motorcycle accident while his blood alcohol level was 0.254%, because there was 
conflicting evidence about whether there was a causal connection between the intoxication and the 
accident); Remedies v. Trans. World Life Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1380 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (holding that 
the presumption of intoxication in the Louisiana driving while intoxicated criminal statute is only 
applicable to criminal cases and could not be used by the insurance company to establish the insured’s 
intoxication); Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Gammons, 408 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (insurer is 
required to show intoxication was “the” proximate cause of death, not merely “a” proximate cause); 
American Family Life Assur. Co. v. Russell, 700 N.E.2d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (intoxication alone not 
enough to trigger alcohol exclusion in AD&D policy; insured must have been participating in some 
activity while intoxicated where the activity itself caused death). 
22 30 Cal. App. 4th 816, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897 (1st Dist. 1994). 
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 In general, courts take a strict approach to the enforcement of insurance 
contracts, because of the uneven bargaining power between the insurer and the insured 
as well as the fact that the insurer has itself drafted and sold the contract.23  At the same 
time, courts may uphold insurers’ ability to enforce their agreements even where 
procedures were defective.  For example, in a recent decision, the Court of Appeals of 
Oregon held that an issuer was permitted to defend an intoxication exclusion in group 
AD&D coverage contract authorized by a state insurance statute, even where it failed to 
provide notice to the insured (and to insurance regulators) that the policy contained 
such an exclusion.24 
 
 
c. Defining intoxication 
 
 State courts have also adopted different strategies to define what constitutes 
intoxication for the purposes of insurance coverage exclusions.  In Bishop v. National 
Health Insurance Co.,25  the Second Circuit upheld a provision in an insurance contract 
that defined “drunk” by reference to Connecticut’s drunk driving statute.  In Mahoney v. 
Union Pacific R.R. Employees’ Hosp. Ass’n,26 however, a provision in a group medical 
policy excluded benefits for injuries where the insured’s intoxication exceeded “legal 
limits.”  The court in that case refused to uphold denial of coverage to an insured, 
whose blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.201, because the injury did not arise from 
driving, and there was no legal limit for nondriving intoxication in Nebraska.  The court 
reasoned that if the insurer wanted to use the drunk driving statute as a standard, it 
should have incorporated the standard by reference in its policy.  Similarly, the 
Louisiana Court of Appeals held that the presumption of intoxication in the Louisiana 
driving-while-intoxicated statute was applicable only to criminal cases and could not be 
used by the insurance company to establish the insured’s intoxication.  In Vulcan Life 
Ins. Co. v. Davenport,27 the court found that where the insured sought to recover under a 
health insurance policy which did not define the term “drunk,” the jury was correctly 
instructed that being “drunk” meant that the insured was overcome by alcoholic liquor 
to the point of losing control over his faculties.  The court held that 
   
We are not inclined to accept Vulcan's arguments that under Georgia case 
law, since Davenport's blood alcohol intoxication level would support a 
conviction of DUI as defined by [the Georgia DWI statute], he was ‘drunk’ 
as a matter of law and thereby excluded from coverage.  When Vulcan 
drafted the policy, if it intended ‘drunk’ to mean having a minimum .10 
blood alcohol level, or being under the influence of an intoxicant in any 
amount whatsoever, or being in a condition as measured by some other 
objective criteria such as physical manifestations, it was bound to have so 
stated.  While it appears to be illogical that a person who pleads guilty to 
driving under the influence and has a blood alcohol level of .19 is 
covered by medical insurance which excludes coverage when injuries 
                                                
23 R. Rosenblatt, S. Law and S. Rosenbaum, 1997.  Law and the American Health Care System 
(Foundation Press, NY, NY) Ch. 2. 
24 Baylor v. Continental Casualty Co., 78 P.3d 108, 113 (Ct. App. Or. 2003). 
25 344 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2003). 
26 471 N.W.2d 438 (Neb. 1991). 
27 191 Ga. App. 79, 380 S.E.2d 751 (1989). 
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result from being ‘drunk,’ the terms of the policy differ from the driving 
prohibitions.28 
 
Finally, in Healthwise of Kentucky, Ltd. v. Anglin,29 a health insurance policy contained 
an exclusion for injuries resulting from “intoxication as defined by Kentucky law.”  The 
court found that the provision was ambiguous and, in applying the principle of contract 
law requiring construing an insurance contract in favor of the insured, held that for the 
exclusion to apply, an insured must have been convicted under the Kentucky criminal 
intoxication statute. 
 
 Some insurance companies define “intoxicated” for the purpose of excluding 
coverage for injuries caused by ingestion of alcohol simply by specifying a BAC over 
which coverage will be denied.  Where the policy does announce a BAC limit, courts 
have upheld this standard regardless of other factors such as causation and other signs 
contradicting the conclusion that the insured was intoxicated.30 
 
d. Administered on the advice of a physician  
 
The UPPL excepts drugs that have been administered on the advice of (i.e., 
prescribed by) a physician.  In a recent Nevada case involving an intoxication 
exclusion in an AD&D policy that allowed payment only when drugs were “taken as 
prescribed by a physician,” the court ordered payment when it found that the insurer 
attempted to unlawfully narrow the exception in its contract terms in order to avoid 
payment for overdoses. 31  Thus, an insured in Nevada who overdoses on prescribed 
medication may escape a drug exclusion policy and be entitled to benefits.   
 
e. Variations on the UPPL 
 
Maine’s exclusionary statute differs from the original UPPL model law in one 
important and expansive respect.  The statute permitting insurance companies to 
exclude coverage for drug- and alcohol-related loss states 
 
The insurer shall not be liable for death, injury incurred, or disease 
contracted while the insured is intoxicated or under the influence of 
narcotics or hallucinogenic drugs unless administered on the advice of a 
physician.32 
 
Research did not reveal any case law where an insurance company sought to deny 
coverage for treatment of a disease contracted while the insured was under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol. 
 
                                                
28 Id. at 755. 
29 956 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1997). 
30 See Jefferson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v Clark, 414 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. App. 1991) (sustaining denial of AD&D 
benefits based on the insured’s BAC, regardless of whether intoxication was the proximate cause of the 
accident); Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998) (sustaining denial of AD&D 
benefits based on insured’s BAC, regardless of absence of conclusive relationship of a particular BAC to 
the insurer’s increased risk). 
31 Hummel v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Nev. 2003). 
32 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A § 2829(3) (emphasis added). 
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f. Reconciling the UPPL exclusion with insurance mandates covering alcohol and drug 
treatment 
 
 An important question lurks below the surface of state laws that follow or 
replicate in some fashion the UPPL: what happens in jurisdictions in which state law 
both allows exclusion of treatment linked to intoxication but also contains coverage 
mandates for drug and alcohol treatment?   
 Table 1 (attached), prepared by “Ensuring Solutions to Alcohol Problems” at 
the George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services, 
summarizes the status of state laws regarding the use of intoxication exclusions in 
insurance policies, alcohol treatment insurance coverage mandates, and mandated BAC 
testing.  The table shows that many states that maintain the UPPL (or maintain silence on 
the subject) also mandate at least some coverage for alcohol and drug treatment in one 
or more categories of insurance contracts.  This juxtaposition of the UPPL statute against 
treatment mandates suggests that even if insurers are authorized to deny coverage for an 
injury resulting from a drug or alcohol exclusion, they cannot also deny coverage for 
drug or alcohol treatment.  
 
For example, Nevada’s statute is virtually identical to the original UPPL in the 
authority it grants insurers to exclude treatment.33  At the same time, Nevada insurance 
law mandates coverage of alcohol and drug treatment in certain policies, including 
policies in which insurers are authorized to incorporate the UPPL exclusion.34  In what 
may be an attempt to account for this seeming paradox, Nevada law also provides that 
if an insurer uses a drug and alcohol exclusion in an insurance contract, the insurer 
 “shall also provide that such provision in no way affects benefits payable 
for the treatment of alcohol or drug abuse….”35   
The Nevada example underscores an obvious conundrum:  state law may 
mandate coverage of treatment for alcoholism and drug addiction; at the same time, 
state law also may allow insurers to exclude all medical treatment (other than treatment 
of the addiction) in connection with injuries arising from the condition.  Whether this 
peculiarity encourages courts to read the exclusion narrowly and the coverage 
mandate broadly is unclear, although the Nevada experience would suggest that the 
answer to this is yes. 
 
The Effects of Simply Repealing a State Intoxication Exclusion Statute 
 
 Maryland, North Carolina and Vermont repealed their laws in 2001.  That these 
states repealed their exclusionary laws does not necessarily mean that insurance 
companies in those states are precluded from continuing their practice.  Unless a court 
is willing to infer from the state legislature’s action in repealing the statutes that a drug 
and alcohol provision is no longer permissible, insurance companies may continue to 
be free to enforce drug and alcohol exclusions.   
 
                                                
33 Nev. Rev. Stat. 689A280(1) (1975). 
34 Nev. Rev. Stat. 689A.030(9). 
35 Nev. Rev. Stat. 689A.280(2). 
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For example, in Sutherland v. N.N. Investors Life Ins. Co., Inc.,36 the federal First 
Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the insured’s claim that because 
Massachusetts had repealed its alcohol exclusion statute in 1971, the legislature intended 
to preclude insurance companies from denying coverage for drug and alcohol 
exclusions.  The First Circuit upheld the district court and denied coverage for the 
insured’s hospital bills after a drunk driving accident, terming as “fallacious” the 
plaintiff’s arguments that Massachusetts’ repeal of its insurance law granting insurers 
express statutory authority to include such an exclusionary clause their policies 
amounted to a prohibition of such clauses.  Even more striking was the court’s refusal 
to prevent the insurer from enforcing such a clause on public policy grounds in the 
face of the state’s repeal:  
 
Apart from the fallacious statutory argument [that the repeal of the UPPL 
model drug and alcohol exclusion in 1971 was meant to end the use of 
the exclusions in insurance contracts], plaintiff cites no cases, anywhere, 
suggesting that it is against public policy to exclude coverage for injuries 
due to intoxication; nor have we found any.  If we were to approach the 
question as an original proposition, we might think that the answer to 
plaintiff's contention that public policy forbade excluding coverage for 
hospital charges due to his children's driving under the influence, would 
be that the public would be better served to have parents aware of, rather 
than relieved of, the economic consequences of their children driving 
intoxicated.  Under the banner of public policy plaintiff is saying 
defendant cannot choose not to indemnify the insured for an illegal act.37 
 
 Courts in states that have repealed the UPPL in the context of health insurance 
can of course continue to uphold such denials of benefits in other insurance markets 
where the repeal is not effective.  (See, for example, Balthis v. AIG Life Ins. Co.,38  which 
construed an exclusionary clause in the context of life insurance.) 
 
State Laws that Prohibit the Use of Exclusionary Provisions Related to Intoxication  
 
 Presumably, the intent of states that repeal the UPPL is to cease the use of 
exclusionary clauses in contracts of insurance, although the caselaw would suggest that 
simple repeal is insufficient.  The question is what happens when states replace the 
UPPL with an outright prohibition on such policies. 
 
In 2001, the NAIC voted unanimously to repeal the original version of the UPPL, 
and adopted an amendment expressly prohibiting health insurers from denying payment 
on the basis of intoxication.39  The amendment to the UPPL provides as follows  
 
(1) This provision may not be used with respect to a medical expense policy (2) 
For purposes of this provision, "medical expense policy" means and accident and 
                                                
36 897 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying Massachusetts law). 
37 Id. at 596. 
38 5 Fed. Appx. 320, 25 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2255 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying North Carolina law). 
39 Insurance Association Repeals Rule on Intoxicated Patients, (press release July 16, 2001), available at 
http://www.naic.org) (accessed February 13, 2004). 
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sickness insurance policy that provides hospital, medical and surgical expense 
coverage.40 
 
Since the revision of the UPPL, only two states--South Dakota and Iowa--have 
adopted statutes prohibiting coverage denials for injuries caused by alcohol intoxication.  
 
South Dakota’s statute provides as follows: 
 
A policy or certificate of health insurance for an individual that is 
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed in this state may not exclude the 
payment of benefits for injuries sustained by an insured person because 
the insured was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, as defined by § 
32-23-1.  Nothing in this section precludes a health insurer from excluding 
coverage for an insured for any sickness or injury caused in the 
commission of a felony.41 
 
In effect, South Dakota’s law preserves the right of insurers not to underwrite the 
risk of criminal conduct but declares injuries resulting from intoxication not to be part 
of a criminal activity.  Research revealed no South Dakota cases interpreting the statute.  
 
Iowa’s exclusionary statute states in relevant part: 
 
Intoxicants and narcotics:  The insurer shall not be liable for any loss 
sustained or contracted in consequence of the insured's being intoxicated 
or under the influence of any narcotic unless administered on the advice 
of a physician.  This provision shall not be used with respect to a medical 
expense policy.  For purposes of this provision, "medical expense policy" 
means an accident and sickness insurance policy that provides hospital, 
medical, and surgical expense coverage.42 
 
Iowa thus adopted the revised UPPL in its entirety. Since the promulgation of the 
revised statute, no Iowa court has directly interpreted the statute in the context of health 
insurance.43 
                                                
40 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines, 
updated January 2004, http://www.naic.org/models_papers/models/Table_of_Contents2003.htm#;  Larry 
M. Gentilello, MD, Implementing Preventive Interventions in Emergency Medicine: Strategic Considerations, 
(white paper for CDC) available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/alcohol_proceedings/Session4-
PDF.pdf 
41 S.D. Codified Laws § 58-17-30.8. 
42 Iowa Code Ann. § 514A.3(2)(K) (West 2003). 
43 One year before Iowa revised its statute, however, the district court for the Northern District of Iowa in 
West v Aetna Life Ins. Co. held that an insurer could not deny AD&D benefits to the survivor of an 
insured who, while driving intoxicated, died in a car crash. The court refused to find that the possibility 
that the insured’s intoxication caused the crash was sufficient to render the crash “non-accidental” so as 
to be excluded from the policy as “non-accidental.”  The policy in West  did not contain an intoxication 
exclusion (although it would have been legal at the time in Iowa), and the court reasoned that a finding 
of “non-accidental,” as it was not defined by the plan, required evidence of foreseeability more than 
merely the insured’s intoxication.  This holding should not be surprising:  in states in which intoxication 
clauses are permitted, an insurer that elects not  to include such a clause in its contract would be held to 
a very high burden of proof before being permitted to give the same meaning to an entirely separate 
clause meant to cover intentional suicides.  But courts historically have come down on both sides of the 
issue, sometimes refusing to view deaths and injuries caused by intentional ingestion of drugs or alcohol 
as “accidental.” See,e.g., Minton v. Stuyvesant Life Ins. Co., 373 F. Supp. 33 (D. Nev. 1974);  Marsh v. Met. 
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Similarly, South Dakota’s other markets maintain exclusionary policies, such as a 
workers’ compensation statute that provides: 
 
No compensation shall be allowed for any injury or death due to the employee’s 
willful misconduct, including intentional self-inflicted injury, intoxication, illegal 
use of any schedule I or schedule II drug, or willful failure or refusal to use a 
safety appliance furnished by the employer, or to perform a duty required by 
statute. The burden of proof under this section shall be on the defendant 
employer.44  
 
Statutes Silent on Alcohol but Permitting Exclusions for Injuries Resulting from 
Narcotics 
  
 Minnesota and Oklahoma have statutes that are silent on the issue of alcohol but 
which permit exclusion of coverage for injuries caused by the insured’s use of 
narcotics.  Minnesota’s statute allow insurers to write provisions stating that “[t]he insurer 
shall not be liable for any loss sustained or contracted in consequence of the insured's 
being under the influence of any narcotic unless administered on the advice of a 
physician.”45  No Minnesota case directly addresses an alcohol exclusion in a health or 
accident insurance policy, but one case in the Court of Appeals of Minnesota indicated 
that the courts may be sympathetic to a revised-UPPL approach.  In Reserve Life Ins. Co. 
v. Commissioner of Commerce,46 the court held that the Commission of Commerce was 
entitled to disapprove a life insurance policy as against public policy because, among 
other things, it contained an AD&D rider excluding coverage for losses caused by an 
insured’s intoxication.  
 
 Oklahoma’s statute permitting a narcotics exclusion is identical to Minnesota’s.  
Although  Oklahoma nor Minnesota law are both are silent on the use of alcohol 
exclusions and are express only with respect to narcotics, this silence, coupled with 
express permission to exclude treatment for narcotics injuries may in fact help claimants 
whose injuries arise from alcoholism.  In other words, courts may be willing to read a 
selective statute as permitting exclusions only in the case of the substances that are 
named, not those that are not.  Looking once again at the body of caselaw arising from 
life insurance policies, in a recent AD&D case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
considered whether an insured’s death was “accidental” or excluded from coverage as 
“intentionally self-inflicted”  where he died in a car crash and where his BAC was two 
and one-half times the legal limit for driving.47  In that case, the policy did not contain 
an alcohol exclusion provision.  In finding in favor of the insured’s beneficiary, the 
court held that voluntary intoxication does not render an accident foreseeable.  A 
similar case was recently decided in Minnesota.48  
                                                                                                                                                       
Life Ins. Co., 388 N.E.2d 1121 (Ill.App.2.Dist. 1979); Harrell v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 937 S.W.2d 
809 (Tenn. 1996); and Bruce v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc., 555 N.W.2d 718 (Mich.App. 1996); but see Jackson v. 
National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 202 S.E.2d 711 (Ga.App. 1973);  Fowler v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 938 F. Supp. 
476 (W.D. Tenn. 1996);  Nelson v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 962 F. Supp. 1010 (W.D. Mich. 1997); 
and Employee Retirement System of Texas v. Cash, 906 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App. 1995). 
44 S.D. Codified Laws § 62-4-37. 
45 Minn. St. Ann. 62A.04.3(11). 
46 402 N.W.2d 631, 632 (Ct. App. Minn. 1987). 
47 Cranfill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 49 P.3d 703, 705 (Okla. 2002). 
48 King v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 02-3934 (8th Cir. Feb. 9, 2004). 
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States with no Drug and Alcohol Exclusion Legislation 
 
Utah, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, and Wisconsin have not enacted any legislation permitting insurance 
companies to exclude coverage for loss incurred in consequence of drugs or alcohol.  
As Bishop reveals, this absence does not mean, however, that in these states insurance 
companies may not write policies with intoxication exclusions.  In Sylvester v. Liberty Life 
Ins. Co.,49 the Colorado Court of Appeals, in the course of upholding a drug and alcohol 
exclusion in a life insurance policy, held that Colorado law does not require the insurer 
to prove that the predominant cause of death of the insured was alcohol.  Instead, all 
that was held to be required was for the insurer to prove that the insured was under the 
influence of alcohol, and there was some causal connection between the intoxication 
and the insured’s death.  And as the Sutherland  case discussed above provides, 
insurers may be free to include an intoxication clause even where a state has repealed 
the UPPL.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 As of 2004, only two states (Iowa and South Dakota) appear to unequivocally 
prohibit the use of intoxication exclusion clauses in health insurance contracts.  
Moreover, even in states that enact health insurance exclusion prohibitions, such 
clauses may remain in the context of workers compensation (a critical form of health 
care payment, particularly for uninsured workers) and AD&D, disability, auto, and 
property and casualty contracts.   
 
The caselaw surrounding these exclusionary clauses suggest that courts vary in 
their approach to construing the meaning of exclusionary provisions.  Some courts will 
set the bar high for insurers by demanding a high burden of proof that turns on a 
showing that intoxication was either the or the primary proximate cause of the injury.  
Other courts are more lenient and allow insurers to prevail on a lesser showing that 
intoxication was somehow involved in the injury. 
 
Regardless of whether courts are strict or liberal in construing the terms of 
contracts, it appears that each class of insurance contract will be considered in the 
context of its own statutory terms. Thus, even if the UPPL is repealed for health 
insurance contracts, this would not affect workers compensation products.  Moreover, a 
simple repeal does not appear to suffice. Statutory silence in the face of insurer custom 
probably will be sufficient to sanction the custom. Thus a repeal unaccompanied by 
extensive history and/or an outright prohibition might yield no result whatsoever where 
industry practices are concerned.  
 
The case law suggests ways to curb the use of intoxication exclusions even if 
there is no consensus regarding their outright elimination.  For example, intoxication 
exclusions could be prohibited in the case of medical payment provisions across all 
classes of insurance contracts (health, workers compensation, or otherwise), not merely 
those contracts that are written to cover medical care losses alone.  Similarly, a 
                                                
49 42 P.3d 38, 100 A.L.R.5th 793 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 
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legislature could set insurers’ burden of proof high, requiring, for example, proof by 
clear and convincing evidence that intoxication was the proximate cause of an injury.   
 
Whatever the approach, the fundamental policy decision is whether certain 
health care costs should be entirely borne by society at large, or through a 
public/private approach that combines risk spreading through insurance contracts with 
direct public support in the case of publicly insured and uninsured persons.  The 
impact on health care quality for persons with alcoholism or addiction problems, as 
well as the viability of hospital emergency departments, would appear to be implicated 
in how states answer this question, particularly since no state with the UPPL as its 
official policy appears to maintain a comprehensive system for financing necessary 
health care arising from intoxication injuries. 
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Appendix 
 
ENSURING SOLUTIONS TO ALCOHOL PROBLEMS 
The George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services 
 
Table 1. 
STATE LAWS PERTAINING TO INTOXICATION EXCLUSIONS IN LICENSED INSURANCE PRODUCTS, VEHICULAR 
CRASH BACi MANDATES, & 
ALCOHOL TREATMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE MANDATES 
 
STATUS OF HEALTH INSURANCE INTOXICATION 
EXCLUSIONii  
STATE 
EXPRESS 
PERMISSIONiii  SILENCE
iv  
EXPRESS 
PROHIBITIONv 
INTOXICATION 
EXCLUSION: 
OTHER 
INSURANCE 
PRODUCTS 
MANDATORY 
BAC OF 
DRIVERS IN 
VEHICULAR 
CRASHES 
ALCOHOL 
TREATMENT 
HEALTH 
INSURANCEM
ANDATE 
AL X   Dvi X  
AK X    X X 
AZ X   D   
AR X   Avii/Lviii X  
CA X   D/LTix X  
CO  X   X  
CT  X   X X 
DE X    X X 
DC X   A X  
FL X    X  
GA X   A X  
HI X   A X X 
ID X   D   
IL X   A X X 
IN X   A X X 
IA   X A X  
KS X   A X X 
KY X    X X 
LA X   A X  
ME X    X X 
MD  X   X X 
MA  X    X 
MI  X    X 
MN  X   X X 
MS X   A X X 
MO X   A X X 
MT X   D X X 
NE X   A X  
NV X    X X 
NH  X   X X 
NJ X    X X 
NM  X   X X 
NY X   A X  
NC   X  X  
ND X   A X X 
OH X   A X X 
OK  X   X  
OR X     X 
PA X   A X X 
RI X   A/LT  X 
SC X   A X  
SD   X  X  
TN X   A   
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STATUS OF HEALTH INSURANCE INTOXICATION 
EXCLUSIONii  
STATE 
EXPRESS 
PERMISSIONiii  SILENCE
iv  
EXPRESS 
PROHIBITIONv 
INTOXICATION 
EXCLUSION: 
OTHER 
INSURANCE 
PRODUCTS 
MANDATORY 
BAC OF 
DRIVERS IN 
VEHICULAR 
CRASHES 
ALCOHOL 
TREATMENT 
HEALTH 
INSURANCEM
ANDATE 
TX X   A X X 
UT  X   X  
VT X    X X 
VA X   A X X 
WA X   D X X 
WV X   A X  
WI  X   X  
WY X    X  
TOTAL 37 11 3 28 44 29 
 
Sources:    1) UPPL state laws: Alcohol Policy Information Service (APIS)  
www.niaaa.nih.gov accessed 2/18/04. 
2) Mandatory BAC testing for drivers who survive a crash: 
http://www3.madd.org/laws/law.cfm?LawID=MSVE accessed 2/18/04;  
States are considered to mandate alcohol treatment in group health 
insurance if they specify either minimum coverage mandates or parity or 
both. 
3) Ensuring Solutions to Alcohol Problems (2002). 
Workplace solutions: Treating alcohol problems through workplace health 
insurance. http://www.ensuringsolutions.org/images/reports/rr1.pdf 
accessed 2/18/04. 
                                                
i Blood-Alcohol Content. 
ii  Includes both group and individual coverage markets. 
iii  Signifies that state law expressly permits licensed insurers to include an intoxication exclusion. 
iv Signifies silence in state law regarding insurers’ use of an intoxication exclusion. 
v Signifies that state law expressly prohibits the use of an intoxication exclusion. 
vi Disability insurance 
vii Accidental death and dismemberment insurance. 
viii  Life insurance. 
ix Long-term care insurance. 
